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Abstract 
Today, architectural theory has atrophied. Despite a perceived need for different theoretical ways of clarifying, explaining and 
understanding the complex phenomena of contemporary architectural production prior to a designer’s intervention, there are few 
existing theoretical frameworks. Without either the descriptive or projective enablement by theory, conscientious and critical 
practices in architecture will have few alternatives against the tide of neoliberal city-making. In this paper, I make a pun of 
Speaks’s (Speaks, 2006) paper titled, ‘Intelligence after theory’ by arguing that while (design) intelligence is necessary, it is 
however not sufficient. Ethics is also needed in architecture. Through a brief restatement of a canonical debate in the critical 
school of architectural theory, I argue why ethics is needed in architecture, and how ethics could be further developed through 
theory and theorization.  
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1. Introduction: the many ‘uses’ of theory and the crisis of place 
Despite a somewhat protracted history and despite that all schools of architecture have courses with the word 
‘theory’ in them, the nature of theory and what ‘architectural theory’ means remain far from clear (Lang, 1987). 
According to the Beaux-Arts tradition, architectural theory was once limited to the set of rules and principles 
guiding the architect’s design compositions (Lavin, 1990; Lucan, 2012). But since the nineteenth century and further 
spurred by the academization of architecture in the 20th century (Speaks, 2006), definitions of ‘architectural theory’ 
have expanded. Today, architectural theory is taken to mean any kind of intellectual discourse outside the activity of 
design, which is at least likely to comprise of the histories of buildings (or theories), and criticism of these histories 
and theories (L. Martin, 2012). Conversely, every kind of ideas and concepts associated to architecture still seeking 
their place could also be categorized under ‘architectural theory’. This openness of architectural theory promises 
intellectual democracy and conceptual vitality; but at the same time, there is also something apprehensive about a 
theoretical reality that is constantly amorphous—especially for an important field of knowledge and practice like 
architecture. It is therefore unsurprising to find even theorists themselves uneager to defend architectural theory 
(Speaks, 2005, 2006), or perhaps discovering theory to be quite ‘dead’ (Hight, 2009).  
But has theory truly “fallen into desuetude” (Speaks, 2006)? Because theory is the intellectual terrain that 
underpins design practices (Taylor & Levine, 2011), the real question is not whether theory has become ‘disused’ or 
even ‘dead’, but instead, what theories are useful or relevant for contemporary architecture today? Without theory—
defined here as knowledge that can foreground units of analysis and explain hypotheses in architecture—it is not 
possible to abstract, contextualize, understand or even predict any built forms and their impacts on the human 
experience. Importantly, theory also permits one to understand architecture in relation to some larger intellectual 
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framework and in this way, reaffirms architecture’s position as the most intellectual of the visual arts (Lavin, 1990). 
And when this theory is systematic, architecture can exceed its status as a material craft and (service) profession, 
and attain the status of a discipline, which at any given moment represents “the most well-honed efforts of human 
beings to approach questions and concerns of importance in a systematic and reliable way” (Gardner, 2000). 
Significantly, a discipline also serves as a repository for puzzles and open questions that are yet solvable, or perhaps 
cannot be solved, within the expertise and lifetime of its most outstanding members. These puzzles and open 
questions then become the epistemological premises for educating the next generation, and form a continuous 
intellectual lineage connecting one generation of architects to the next. 
Therefore, it is puzzling to discover a general “slackening” in the activity of theorizing today (Taylor & Levine, 
2011), when instead, more efforts should be devoted to clarifying the basis, structure and aims of different theories 
relevant and useful for architecture. Importantly, this slackening not only impacts theory development and 
transmission within the academia, but it also translates into a kind of helplessness, tantamount to haplessness, in 
practice. Specifically, I suggest that the crisis of place in architecture—defined as the absence of an effective 
counter-response, practical or theoretical, to the concerted and rapacious advances of neoliberal place-making 
institutions and developments today (Mayer, 2010)—could be seen as a direct casualty of this slackening.  
Increasingly salient and rapidly accelerated, massive developmental projects have become a key staple of 
contemporary architectural production all over the world today, especially pronounced in fast-paced Asia. Entire 
city blocks (if not cities themselves) have been overturned to make way for large-scale urban projects that have 
unfortunately come to characterize most of Asian urbanism. It is like the Haussmannization of Paris all over again; 
only now, it is far more constant, intense, and incurs destruction on a larger—environmental and global—scale. To 
paraphrase the architectural critic Ada Louise Huxtable (Huxtable, 2001) here, ‘development has become destiny’, 
for much of contemporary architecture today.  
And often masquerading as the materialization of authentic, endearing and impressionable spaces, many of 
these projects in contemporary architecture only turn out to become artificial places: the epitome of sterile 
‘placelessness’, where ‘place’ when it exists, is merely harnessed as an image to sell more effectively (Relph, 1996) 
within the experience economy (Pine & Gilmore, 2011). One such telling project is the recent case of Oculus, a 
shopping mall and transit hub designed by architect Santiago Calatrava on the Ground Zero site in Lower 
Manhattan, which has been criticized for being insensitive to the history, and the gravitas, of this place (Dunlap, 
2016). Indeed, is the celebration of buying and selling by architecture even appropriate to the historical gravity of 
mass violence and the memories of the deceased in this place? Is the architect really a tool of whatever system he or 
she operates in (Goodman, 1971)? And has the architect ceased to question the design brief (Medina, 2015)? On 
this, architectural theory has largely fallen silent on the crisis of place even when theory presents the very source of 
help to clarify, explain and offer recourses. In the words of Martin (R. Martin, 2011) commenting on the Occupy 
Wall Street in New York City, “architectural thinking can contribute something invaluable…by offering tangible 
models of possible worlds, possible forms of shelter, and possible ways of living together, to be debated in general 
assemblies both real and virtual.” On the other hand, silence implies that there is no better alternative—or other 
moral visions of space and place—beyond the flattened reality of such commerce-led developments. This one-
dimensional worldview of development then renders architectural theory ineffective, if not completely nullified: 
after all, what is the point of theorizing when there can be no expected better utility or possibility?  
 
1.1. Structure of the paper and the need for ethics 
In this paper, I argue for a reinstatement of architectural theory in a milieu when theory has ostensibly been 
sidelined. Furthermore, I contend that while certain subsets of architectural theory might have gone out of 
intellectual circulation for various reasons, however relevant theories and theorization in architecture have yet to 
relinquish their significance. If the discipline of architecture is said to comprise of autonomy (i.e., critique, 
representation and signification) and instrumentality (i.e., projection, performativity and pragmatics) (Somol & 
Whitin, 2002), then it is possible to suggest that while the ideologies underpinning the project of autonomy might 
have wavered, the directive of instrumentality concerning the productive use of theories has hardly changed.  
And on this note, I further suggest that theory has become even more essential in the contemporary context. 
Today, architects work across political and cultural boundaries (McNeill, 2009), confronting unprecedented realities 
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and dilemmas that have to be first framed and understood theoretically before they can meaningfully and 
responsibly intervene through design. On the other hand, young architects (or aspiring students) interested in 
pursuing critical practice—defined as an organized and systematic activity that mobilizes architecture as a 
conceptual, creative and constructive possibility to question inequitable practices or to materialize positive and more 
equitable futures—have nowhere to turn to for intellectual inspiration. However, a growing and vibrant theoretical 
climate in architecture may present the necessary and formative environment for such inspirations to thrive.  
Specifically, I shall then argue for the relevance of ethics in architectural theory. As an acknowledgment to 
Speaks’s (Speaks, 2006) ‘Intelligence after theory’, I concur with Speaks that intelligence is necessary for 
architectural innovation, but it is however not sufficient. By intelligence, (Speaks, 2006) implies the need for 
innovative problem solving governed by an entrepreneurial logic: to discover new design opportunities in the market 
economy against what he perceives as the passivity (or fatalism) of Tafurian architectural theory against this market 
economy. Furthermore, he implies in an earlier piece of writing that this intelligence has to do with a form of non-
ideological, opportunistic and open learning in an uncertain (business) environment—adding value on top of solving 
the problem through design (Speaks, 2002). But I posit that his position on this form of value-added intelligence is 
inadequate. Instead, the real question for architecture has always been: how ethical is our creativity (or innovative 
intelligence) in design (Moran, 2014)? Because architecture is quintessentially about the activities of inhabitation 
and emplacement in the environment (Mugerauer & Manzo, 2008), intelligence alone is insufficient; a concern for 
ethics is also paramount.  
Furthermore, this emphasis on ethics is hardly founded on just its inherent appeal in architecture. Through the 
brief survey of a debate on the ‘critical canon’ of architectural theory, I suggest that ethics is a common but tacit 
thread in this debate; moreover, ethics may also provide answers to the doubts raised by the various theorists in this 
debate. My aim is not to capture either the theoretical nuances or the genealogical divergences that have come to 
characterize the contemporary discourse of ‘criticality’ in architecture (Baird, 2004). Instead, I render this debate—
while genealogically remote from the Asian context but nonetheless still relevant in keeping to its counter-stance 
against much of contemporary architecture in Asia and elsewhere—as the theoretical backdrop in order to 
foreground my arguments for ethics in architecture.  
Specifically, I examine the historiography of this debate prompted by (Speaks, 2005) questioning the validity 
of the ‘critical canon’. I trace the development of this debate through the writings of Manfredo Tafuri (1935-1994) 
via (Hays, 2010), (Speaks, 2005), (Hight, 2009), and then (Deamer, 2015), before concluding in the case of the most 
recent Venice Architecture Biennale, ‘Reporting from the Front’ (Schumacher, 2016) curated by Alejandro Aravena. 
By analyzing the trajectory of this debate, I suggest that one missing assumption—and theoretical concept—in all 
these different theoretical positions and stakes is ethics; that only by acknowledging and then explicating the nature 
of this ethics can the discipline of architecture once more reconcile itself to the possibility of relevant, critical 
theories.   
 
2. A brief survey on the present status of the critical canon within architectural theory  
The ‘critical canon’ is one of the more distinctive discourses that have suffused and sustained much of the 
intellectual debates and discussions within Anglophone (but primarily North America) architectural theory since the 
1960s. One important debate within this canon took place slightly more than a decade ago, which subsequently 
developed into what is now known as the ‘post-critical school’ (Deamer, 2015). Long buttressed by ideas from 
Tafuri and other Frankfurt School thinkers, the critical canon comprises of an ensemble of various avant-gardist 
theories too ambivalent to be summarized or categorized under any one single banner. Even so, it is not inaccurate 
to suggest that it is unambiguously focused on restating and resisting the different rationalities capitalism has 
imposed on architecture and architectural production. But finding these rationalities un-resistible (or inescapable) 
under the conditions of late capitalism, this critical canon also sought to define an autonomous sphere of intellectual 
discourse for architecture through theorization and theory.  
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In this debate, (Speaks, 2005) argued against the relevance of this critical canon in a world structured by the 
conditions of the market economy. For Speaks, architecture, if it is to be properly advanced, has to shed the twin 
insularities of its autonomy and resistance that have long characterized the architectural avant-garde. Subsequently, 
architecture is to develop in ways that can be better aligned to the expectations and opportunities of the market 
economy. Observing that opportunities abound in a milieu shaped by the innovative zest of entrepreneurialism (i.e., 
this was during the boom before the Financial Crisis in 2008), Speaks argued that this critical canon has become 
something of an impediment to a culture of innovation in architecture. In his view, architecture schools should 
instead engage in technological and entrepreneurial experimentations in order to produce design knowledge better 
aligned to the needs and anticipations of the marketplace.  
Speaks’s position should first be contextualized in the milieu of his practice. Since the late 1960s, the critical 
canon in architectural theory has been shaped by a body of ‘negative vanguard theories’, which are not only critical 
of the status quo (especially the status quo of capitalism), but also are characterized by a state of profound design 
passivity stemming from a resistance against the institutional advances of capitalism—that in sum, contradicts what 
Speaks believes architecture is all about. This passivity is largely due to Tafuri’s ‘double-bind’—perceivably also a 
moral dilemma—which (Hays, 2010) summed up aptly, and is also worthwhile to cite in full: 
 
“To the extent that architecture can function in a capitalist society, it inevitably reproduces the structure of 
that society in its own immanent logics and forms. When architecture resists, capitalism withdraws it from 
service—take it offline…Tafuri asserts the intolerable but inescapable conditions of possibility for 
contemporary architecture: to collapse into the very system that condemns architecture to pure means-ends 
instrumentality, or to retreat into hypnotic solitude, recognizing that there is no longer a need for 
architecture at all.” (Hays, 2010: 3) 
 
In other words for Tafuri, to participate in architecture is to further the very cause of capitalism, and its 
immanent logics and forms; but to resist capitalism via architecture implies (very likely) the nullification of itself, 
which is self-contradictory—therefore, a ‘double-bind’. And so (Speaks, 2005) proposes to advance the interests of 
architecture by breaking this ‘double-bind’: to work with the opportunities for innovation offered by the market 
economy rather than resisting them (with theory or otherwise).  
While the logic in this ‘double-bind’ appears watertight—that is, if one accepts Tafuri’s pessimistic, dialectical 
assumptions—in reality things are looser. Indeed, empirically it is uncertain if functioning as a conscientious 
architect within a capitalist society always and inevitably reproduces the structure of its immanent (oppressive) 
logics and forms. Architects can also locate various opportunities to design for those who have been sidelined by 
present economic institutions. For instance, Csutoras and Liando’s recent temporary Kineforum Misbar in Jakarta is 
one example where the architects enacted design for inclusivity and justice (Harvey, 2014). This point has long been 
the staple of a softer blend of Tafurian thought espoused—ironically—by Speaks’s teacher Fredric Jameson (Baird, 
2004; Jameson, 1985). And in a recent reassessment of the different critical positions in contemporary architecture, 
(Deamer, 2015) suggests three plausible options: (i) to continue resisting capitalism as the precondition and purpose 
of architecture by following the critical canon of Tafuri and Hays (and to remain confined to the rigidity of the 
‘double-bind’); (ii) to adopt Speaks’s position, that is, the post-critical school, by aligning with the forces and 
opportunities of the market economy; or (iii) to identify the contradictions and gaps of capitalism and institutions of 
capitalism, and subsequently, by pursuing subversive projects or tactical reforms through architecture for a more 
equitable social state.  
If Deamer is correct in showing the spread of these options, then contra Speaks, the critical canon in 
architectural theory has not so much lost its relevance; rather, it merely requires, and involves, a kind of practical 
savvy and conviction for spotting and adapting to the new conditions of late capitalism implied by the third option. 
In other words because this third option has never been closed off at any point in time, it is unclear if (Speaks, 2005) 
was simply tendentious in his interpretation of the critical canon and its perceived rigidities, or merely reacting out 
of his better interest to align with the opportunities of the market economy.  
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2.1. The missing—or avoided—assumption? Ethics in architectural theory 
 
However, neither Jameson nor Deamer explicitly mentioned the basis of the conviction in their respective 
version of theory. Is this conviction merely grounded in the ideology of class-conflict? Even if it is, is not this 
ideology also founded on deeper virtues—virtues such as greater equality or even compassion, which in one 
consistent form is the ethical belief that it is wrong to enjoy bountiful abundance while many others have next to 
nothing or suffer from poverty? In other words, the de-coupling of ideology from ethics reveals that while the 
Tafurian ideology has to presume ethics, however ethics does not need to presume Tafurian ideology. The history of 
architecture is replete with architects who did not explicitly subscribe to the Tafurian ideology (or Marxian 
ideologies for that matter), but who nonetheless either had periodically stepped away from commercial practice to 
help, or had devoted their professional lives toward addressing some deep social needs or injustices (e.g., Rural 
Studio, or Architecture for Humanity). These are also practices that appear morally consistent to what Jameson, 
Hays, or even Tafuri may espouse as a form of critical architecture (Baird, 2004). In other words through this 
decoupling, it is possible to relinquish the stranglehold of Tafuri’s ‘double-bind’ yet adhere to its ethic—only if 
because an architect has a conscience and architectural production also has agency (Awan, Schneider, & Till, 2011). 
Even so, this ‘architectural conscience’, or the ethics that can better specify this agency, has yet to be fully 
explicated by any systematic architectural theory.  
Subsequently, it was (Hight, 2009) who picked up on the aftermath of this debate in an article pronouncing the 
‘death of theory’. Hight is certainly correct when he suggests that the debate of (Speaks, 2005) versus the critical 
canon was not only an internal (and generational) skirmish within the ranks of the critical canon in architectural 
theory, but also that it hardly represented the general—and growing—horizon of what architectural theory should 
come to entail. In Hight’s view, pressing issues such as climate change, income inequality, sustainability, radical 
terrorism and securitization all can impact architecture, and these issues ought to rightly fall under the purview of 
any relevant architectural theory. To boost the discipline’s chance in confronting these issues as each can come to 
impact practice, Hight suggests that it is necessary to engage these concerns theoretically in architecture. Yet again 
for Hight’s call to be heeded, his argument has to assume the same kind of moral conviction or ethics. Indeed, why 
should an architect probe into issues and problems canonically considered external to the discipline unless she is 
also willing to take on new responsibilities that are considered supererogatory? And is not the willing acceptance of 
supererogatory responsibilities also an indicator of superior moral behavior? Therefore, Hight’s attempt to 
contemporize Speaks’s debate has merely resurfaced the need to acknowledge some kind of moral convictions in 
architecture—which Hight only presumed but was unready to answer.   
Here, I suggest that Hight’s call to widen the scope of architectural theory was addressed—but only in part—in 
the recent 15th Venice Architecture Biennale 2016, titled, ‘Reporting from the Front’. In stark contrast to all prior 
Biennales, this Biennale showcases the different and many social and political roles architecture play, and how these 
efforts are indicative of the broader relevance of architecture to the most urgent issues and problems in the world: 
issues such as migration, pollution, waste and human rights violations among many others (Wainwright, 2016). 
While the direction of the 2016 Biennale could be perceived as a rebuff to the relatively insular 2014 Biennale 
curated by Rem Koolhaas, it is also consistent to suggest that the 2016 Biennale is but a demonstration of how the 
discipline of architecture could begin to assume greater responsibilities in an increasingly uncertain and volatile 
world. However, this curatorial direction by architect Alejandro Aravena is not without detractors. Of note, Patrik 
Schumacher has publicly denounced Aravena’s attempt as dabbling in issues external to the discipline of 
architecture, which ought to only concern itself with the “real” agendas of architecture (Schumacher, 2016)—even 
though he does not exactly say what these real agendas are. And despite that many exhibits showcased in the 
Biennale can be considered demonstrations of architecture’s supererogatory responsibilities, one would be hard-
pressed to locate either the word ‘ethics’, or some descriptions consistent to ‘moral responsibility’ in any of the 
writings accompanying these exhibit (i.e., the author, who visited the Biennale during the Preview week to study it, 
could not find any instances even though he really tried). To quote a curator from a prominent museum during a 
personal conversation: “it was as if the word ‘ethics’ was deliberately, and systematically removed” (personal 
correspondence). Therefore yet again like (Hight, 2009), it is not possible to advance the discipline of architecture 
fruitfully unless architects begin to acknowledge and explicate the nature of their ethics: values and convictions that 
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go beyond professional concerns, which are presumed by the type of engagements showcased in the Biennale. And 
without explicating this ethics, Schumacher’s claim of suspicion that these architectural engagements were merely 
‘posturing’ and playing to the tune of political correctness can never be properly countered.  
3. Ethics after theory 
Therefore, to follow through on the theoretical bottlenecks aforementioned, it is important to address both the 
reluctance and neglect of ethics in architecture. Empirically however, it is somewhat puzzling to observe this degree 
of reluctance to acknowledge ethics in architecture despite that a significant number of students in architecture 
entering the field are motivated to improve lives and the living environment. In one authoritative study conducted by 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching on architecture education (Boyer & Mitgang, 1996), it 
was found that slightly less than half of all the students surveyed elected to study architecture not so much out of 
motivations for money or prestige, but because they wanted to improve the quality of life in their community and the 
built environment. If this finding is taken as an indication for a large group of architecture students in every 
generation, then there is all the more reason to advance ethics in architecture as a form of knowledge that can guide 
them.   
In the past, students who exhibited such moral convictions could find some modicum of intellectual 
reassurances (or guidance) within the various ‘negative vanguard theories’ of the critical canon. In other words, the 
moral convictions of these students could continue to be nurtured through insights or ideas found in these theories. 
However because many of these ‘negative vanguard theories’ were in large part derived from the political 
experiences and philosophies of the 1960s, they have gradually either lost most of their luster or relevance for the 
generation today, who are weaned on a vastly different ideological staple of experience and ideas (Hays, 1998). 
Without the commensurate knowledge that can help to inform and guide these moral convictions already present in 
a great number of architecture students, these convictions risk either being snuffed out eventually by the complex 
pressures of practice, or even distorted by agendas inimical to the aims of architecture. Therefore, to maintain the 
relevance and significance of architectural theory and simultaneously to nurture these moral convictions, it is 
important to develop a theoretical line of inquiry on ethics in architecture.  
4. Conclusion: The hypothetical constitution of ethics after theory in architecture 
But ethics is also a nascent line of inquiry in architecture. In concluding this paper, by revisiting the small 
cluster of literature on this subject, I suggest three promising vectors to establish a theory of ethics in architecture. 
They are namely:   
 
4.1. Ethics represented or embodied by a built work of architecture (Chan, 2015) 
 
This first vector represents the earliest and most contentious, but perhaps also the most familiar line of thinking 
on ethics in architecture. Chiefly, this vector suggests that a built work of architecture not only can represent certain 
moral values, but it also can come to embody these values. For instance, A.W.N. Pugin (1812-1852) thought that the 
Gothic style (i.e., aesthetics) represented the virtue of truthfulness (Saint, 2005); but many late reformist jails in 18th 
century England were embodied with spatial features aiming to attain desirable behaviors (Evans, 1982), which the 
Panopticon (prison) remains the most familiar to architects. Contemporary examples of such architecture that 
embody the ‘moral values’ of their designers, and subsequently are given form before being imposed to ‘steer 
behavior’ abound (Schrijver, 2015): ranging from the communitarian ethos of New Urbanism, to road sharing urban 
design, to the interior architecture of casinos (Schüll, 2012) and even to prison design (Sperry, 2014). A recent 
debate on the role of the architects in creating such architecture, where “the architecture is the control” (Sanchez & 
Field, 2015) took place in the United States (Sperry, 2014).  
Despite the mounting evidence of this vector, architects and theorists have been slow to accept it. This vector 
has traditionally been criticized as nothing short of an “ethical fallacy” (Scott, 1980), or more recently, as a form of 
“phony ethics” (Till, 2009), or more generally as “a form of mysticism” misrepresenting ethics in a built work of 
architecture, which presumably has no human agency, hence incapable of either an embodiment of ethics or moral 
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responsibility (S. Fisher, 2000). I suggest that these criticisms are a tad hasty. Importantly, none of these critiques 
acknowledge the examples of ‘manipulative’ designs I cited earlier, where it has been possible to emplaced certain 
design features with the aim of modifying or compelling desired or desirable behaviors. Even if architects continue 
to demur on the more drastic idea of value embodiment, it is still hard to dismiss the corollary claim that whenever 
architects build, their designs will shape the way people live and thus will either reinforce some existing patterns, or 
come to resist these patterns (Harries, 2010). In this way according to (Harries, 2010), architects can never escape 
the responsibility in choosing, or staking, a certain position in steering how people will come to dwell in the space 
they have designed. Preferential embodiment of some values that the architect perceives as ‘virtues’ is therefore 
only one short step away after the making of this necessary choice.  
 
4.2. Ethics within the institutions or processes of architectural production 
 
On the other hand, the second vector firstly presumes the differentiation between the architect as a person, and 
the architect as a professional bound to his or her own organizational context. Secondly, this vector also presumes 
that this organizational context can impact the quality of moral deliberations and actions of this architect. Because 
one of the purposes of any effective organization is to control and predict the actions of its executives via a code of 
conduct (Barnard, 1968), and because psychologists have also discovered that moral behaviors are sensitive to 
circumstantial variations in the environment (Doris, 2003), how an architect then becomes subjectivized by the 
value influences of his or her organization or practice environment is therefore an important dimension of study if 
theorists are to advance knowledge of ethics in architecture.  
And naturally, this vector can first be broached through the discourse of role ethics (Wolgast, 1992), where the 
professional, subjected to a certain set of codes and obligations imposed by his or her institutional role, may act in 
ways otherwise found impermissible by the standards of social norms (Applbaum, 1999), or conversely, may not act 
in ways otherwise found permissible by the standards of social norms. Should an architect receive ‘gifts’ from a 
contractor? As an integral part of fostering personal relationships, gifting and receiving gifts is permissible, if not 
always encouraged. But in the context of professional practice, this practice of gifting and receiving gifts then 
implicates issues of conflicts of interest, which can cloud professional judgment. And when an architect is caught 
between the clients’ wishes—which her superiors in the firm abide by—and the conflicting needs of the community 
where her work would be built, how should this architect decide (T. Fisher, 2010)? Should the architect immediately 
respond to her better conscience? Or should she attempt to reopen negotiations with her superiors and clients?  
Importantly for this vector, conventional interpretations of such ethical dilemmas have either portrayed the 
architect as the ‘prima donna’ (Blake, 1976), who would decide according to his or her inclination, or otherwise, 
portrayed the architect as one who is to singularly represent and serve the clients’ interests. Clearly, neither 
interpretation accurately reflects the moral complexities found in contemporary practice characterized by conflicting 
value systems and pluralistic interests. Developing this vector further through theory may help architects to better 
think about their obligations to society and environment on the one hand, and on the other, on how to better clarify 
such dilemmas and to propose substantive recourse when they are not amenable to an immediate resolution. If truly 
there can be no ideal resolution, then at least it is possible through this vector to discover the specifications of an 
ethical compromise.  
 
4.3. Ethics of the architect as a person 
 
Finally, the third vector posits the centrality of the personhood of the architect in ethics. In moral philosophy, 
this is also the most classical way of understanding ethics as virtue ethics: neither through moral rules nor (desired) 
consequences but through understanding the various attributes of the human character that enable what is deemed as 
desirable and ethical behavior. To the extent that a great number of exemplars have gone against all odds to 
materialize their moral visions for the benefit of the many despite social or organizational constraints (Damon & 
Colby, 2015), there are sound reasons to think that virtue ethics also offers a way to advance ethics in architecture.  
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Importantly, this is a vector that ought to be strategically but also cautiously pursued in architecture education. 
To contextualize virtue ethics in architecture is first to ask: what are the different virtues necessary for the 
responsible practice of architecture and specifically, how can they be attained? Empirically, honesty in material 
usage and integrity in craftsmanship still espoused by a number of conscientious practitioners—either corresponding 
to their own principles they bring into practice or out of their obligations to the standards of professional practice—
have consistently resulted in better buildings, lesser material wastage and longer building life-spans. And 
anecdotally observing students who have participated in service learning studios working with under-privileged 
communities, these students tend to show greater awareness and empathy to actual and real needs over the imagined 
ones during design. 
Even so, this vector also raises many uneasy questions. For example, what is considered a desirable character 
trait or virtue, and to what extent should educators reinforce this in design learning? And is character or virtue 
cultivation even part of learning in any modern research university? While there are again sound reasons not to 
include virtue cultivation in design learning, it is also important to recognize that architecture school represents the 
final phase of the student’s formal learning before practice; and to relinquish this opportunity for cultivating certain 
virtues important for conscientious and responsible practice is also to abandon the only hope that can advance ethics 
in architecture systematically and substantively through the personhoods of these future architects.  
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